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MIRANDA, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
CONGRESS 
David A. Strauss* 
Are Miranda warnings required by the Constitution, or not? If 
they are, why has the Supreme Court repeatedly said that the rights 
created by Miranda are "not themselves rights protected by the 
Constitution"?1 If not, why can't an Act of Congress, such as 18 U.S.C. 
3501, declare them to be unnecessary? 
These were the central questions posed by United States v. 
Dickerson.2 It is not clear that the majority opinion ever really an­
swered them. The majority said that "Miranda is constitutionally 
based,''3 that Miranda has "constitutional underpinnings,''4 that 
Miranda is "a constitutional decision,"5 and that Miranda "announced 
a constitutional rule."6 But the dissent chided the majority for being 
unable to bring itself to "come out and say quite clearly: 'We reaffirm 
today that custodial interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda 
warnings or their equivalent violates the Constitution of the United 
States. "'7 
To put the dissent's point more precisely, the Dickerson majority 
never said that the Fifth Amendment is violated whenever a statement 
obtained in violation of Miranda is admitted against an accused. 8 The 
* Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. A.B. Harvard, 1973; 
B. Phil. Oxford, 1975; J.D. Harvard, 1978. - Ed. This Essay was prepared for a Symposium 
at the University of Michigan Law School, entitled Miranda after Dickerson: The Future of 
Confession Law. I am grateful to those present at the Symposium for questions and com­
ments, and to Crista Leahy for research assistance. In order to discount for possible bias, the 
reader should know that I helped represent the United States in some of the cases discussed 
here. 
1. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 
433, 444 (1974)); see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 307 (1985) (Miranda "sweeps 
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself'; "Miranda's preventive medicine provides a 
remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm"); Davis 
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1994); Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 690-91 
(1993); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 
528 (1987). 
2. 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). 
3. Id. at 2334. 
4. Id. at 2334 n.5. 
5. Id. at 2329. 
6. Id. at 2336. 
7. Id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
8. The dissent's formulation is misleading because even under Miranda, what the 
Constitution (arguably) prohibits is the admission into evidence of statements obtained by 
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Court's earlier statements to the effect that Miranda establishes only a 
"prophylactic rule" that "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth 
Amendment itself"9 seemed to preclude the Dickerson majority from 
making that assertion. The dissent concluded that "[t]he Court there­
fore acts in plain violation of the Constitution when it denies effect to" 
§ 3501.10 
At first glance, the dissent's logic seems powerful. The 
Constitution protects certain rights. The Supreme Court's job is to de­
termine what rights the Constitution protects. If an Act of Congress 
infringes those rights, it is invalid. But an Act of Congress that does 
not violate the Constitution must be enforced. If a violation of 
Miranda is not a violation of the Constitution, how can the Court en­
force Miranda in the face of a contrary Act of Congress? 
In fact, however, the dissent's attack on the majority opinion is 
mistaken - doubly mistaken - and its mistakes illuminate something 
fundamental about constitutional law. The dissent is mistaken, first, in 
its understanding of how courts develop the principles of constitu­
tional law that they enforce. Miranda rules are "prophylactic" rules 
that "go beyond the Constitution itself" in the sense that the Miranda 
rules do not simply reflect the values protected by the Fifth 
Amendment. The Miranda rules also reflect judgments about how 
those values can best be secured, given the capacities and propensities 
of the various institutions involved - in the case of Miranda, the po­
lice and the lower courts. Virtually all of constitutional law, however, 
consists of principles that are shaped in part by institutional judgments 
of this kind. In Miranda, the Court did this shaping self-consciously 
and more or less explicitly. But in principle, Miranda is no different 
from any number of well-established rules of constitutional law that 
also, in a sense, "sweep[ ] more broadly than the [Constitution] itself." 
The dissent's second mistake is in its conception of Congress's role 
in developing constitutional principles. When the courts determine 
that the Constitution requires a certain result, it may follow that 
Congress cannot disagree - but that conclusion need not follow. It all 
depends (or at least it should depend) on whether Congress is in a bet-
custodial interrogation without warnings. It seems doubtful that questioning a suspect in cus­
tody without warnings would violate the Constitution if the statements were never used as 
evidence, unless the interrogation were in some other way abusive. See, e.g., Charles D. 
Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121, 1159 (2001). The 
Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment by itself does not forbid the government 
to compel answers to questions; indeed the government often does so, when it immunizes 
witnesses and requires their testimony before grand juries, for example. The Fifth 
Amendment is violated when compelled statements are admitted into evidence against the 
speaker in a criminal prosecution. The question about Miranda is whether it violates the 
Constitution to admit into evidence, in a criminal prosecution, statements obtained from the 
accused by custodial interrogation conducted without warnings. 
9. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985). 
10. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2338 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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ter position to make the judgments, including the judgments about 
other institutions' capacities and propensities, that are necessarily in­
volved in elaborating constitutional law. This mistake by the dissent 
reflects a common way of thinking about the relationship between the 
courts and Congress. The common idea is that decisions by the 
Supreme Court are either "interpretations of the Constitution" or 
"decisions that Congress can modify." (Decisions in the latter category 
are sometimes called "constitutional common law."11) The mistake is 
in not recognizing that a decision may be both an interpretation of the 
Constitution and a principle that Congress may modify. 
The dissent's two mistakes are related. Part of what the courts do, 
when they elaborate principles of constitutional law, is to make com­
plex judgments of a factual nature about the capacities and propensi­
ties of various institutions. Sometimes, Congress will be in as good a 
position as the courts to make these judgments. When Congress is as 
qualified as the courts are to make these judgments, Congress is enti­
tled to play a co-equal role in elaborating constitutional principles. 
Because the dissent in Dickerson (and others who echo its logic) failed 
to understand how principles of constitutional law are developed, it 
also did not understand how Congress should be allowed to contribute 
to that process. This second mistake - to understate the proper role 
of Congress in elaborating constitutional principles - is a characteris­
tic of some of the Supreme Court's most prominent recent decisions. 
In this Essay I will try to spell out, and defend, these positions. 
Specifically, I will argue that it is misleading to ask whether Miranda 
warnings are "required by the Constitution" or are mere "prophylactic 
rules" that "go beyond" what "the Constitution itself" requires. It is 
misleading because constitutional rules - routinely, unavoidably, and 
quite properly - treat "the Constitution itself" as requiring "prophy­
laxis." In principle Miranda is, in this respect, just like many other 
constitutional rules of undoubted legitimacy. 
The conclusion that Miranda is as legitimate as other well­
established constitutional principles does not entail, however, that 
Congress is precluded from modifying it. Congress's role does not de­
pend on a distinction between "the Constitution itself" (supposedly 
untouchable by Congress) and "prophylactic" rules that "go beyond" 
the Constitution itself (and therefore, supposedly, can be freely 
changed or rejected by Congress). Nor does Congress's power depend 
on a distinction between "interpreting" the Constitution (supposedly 
the province of the courts) and "enforcing" the Constitution (suppos­
edly the province of Congress). Congress's role in the elaboration of 
11. This distinction between "Marbury-shielded constitutional exegesis" and "congres­
sionally reversible constitutional law" is the basis of the important article by Henry P. 
Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1975). 
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constitutional principles is itself a complex constitutional issue. In 
some areas, Congress can be trusted to superintend the development 
of constitutional principles; in other areas Congress cannot be trusted 
to do so. These are, in fact, familiar features of our constitutional or­
der, even if we do not often describe them in this way, and even if the 
current Supreme Court, in some of its recent decisions, has not prop­
erly understood this aspect of the Constitution. Or so I contend. 
I. MIRANDA AS A PROPHYLACTIC RULE 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides that no person 
shall "be compelled to be a witness against himself" in any criminal 
case. 1 2  If every statement obtained in violation of Miranda were "com­
pelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, then Miranda 
would follow from the Fifth Amendment, in a relatively straightfor­
ward fashion. 1 3  But the Court has not been willing to assert that every 
statement obtained in violation of Miranda is compelled. 14 There are 
hypothetical examples that seem to make such an assertion implausi­
ble: a suspect, sophisticated about criminal law, only ambiguously in 
custody, still in comfortable surroundings (in his or her own home, 
say), who answers a single question asked in a surpassingly gentle 
manner - that kind of thing. Even apart from such an extreme hypo­
thetical case, it is possible to imagine relatively realistic situations in 
which custodial questioning without warnings would produce answers 
that we would not characterize as "compelled" in the ordinary sense of 
that term. 1 5  
Miranda is based exclusively on the Self-Incrimination Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. Why, then, does Miranda exclude statements 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
13. Only relatively straightforward, because there would still be a question whether a 
person is a "witness" in a criminal case when statements are obtained from him in an out-of­
court interrogation and then admitted into evidence in the criminal prosecution. The defini­
tive (affirmative) answer to this question is given in Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gate­
houses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 
1 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965). 
14. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 446 
(1987), and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth 
Amendment Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941, 951 (2001), for an argument that every 
statement obtained in violation of Miranda (or equivalent safeguards) is "compelled" within 
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Rightly or wrongly, however, the Supreme Court has 
not adopted this position. 
15. The Miranda violation in Oregon v. Elstad was not too different from the hypotheti­
cal, at least if the testimony of the officer is credited: the suspect was questioned in his home, 
with his mother in a nearby room; it was not clear that he was under arrest; and, according to 
the officer, the incriminating statement (which was not a confession to a crime but only a 
statement that the accused was at the scene of the crime) was elicited not by a question but 
by the officer's assertion that he believed the accused was involved. 470 U.S. 298, 300-01 
(1985). 
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that are not "compelled"? The basic answer is familiar by now. Before 
Miranda, the courts had no choice but to conduct a case-by-case in­
quiry into whether a particular confession, made in custody, was the 
product of compulsion or was instead made voluntarily. (Formally the 
question was whether the statements were "voluntary" for purposes of 
the Due Process Clause, rather than "compelled" within the meaning 
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, but those two notions can be equated 
for present purposes. ) Those case-by-case inquiries, which had to con­
sider all the circumstances surrounding the confession, were unsatis­
factory in several respects. It is very difficult for a court, after the fact, 
imaginatively to recreate the conditions that existed in a custodial set­
ting. Even if the courts did have a full understanding of the circum­
stances in which the confession was made, there is no metric for the 
courts to use in determining whether those conditions were so coer­
cive that they rendered the confession involuntary for constitutional 
purposes. Because judicial determinations of voluntariness are unreli­
able, law enforcement officers might be encouraged to try to compel 
incriminating statements in relatively subtle ways in the hope that they 
would later be able to convince the courts that the statements were 
not compelled. And even if the courts were able to do a satisfactory 
job of determining voluntariness after the fact, case-by-case determi­
nations, tied as they are to the particular circumstances of each case, 
give law enforcement authorities who want to do the right thing too 
little guidance about how they should proceed. 
Miranda was designed to address these deficiencies in the case-by­
case approach. Whether Miranda succeeds or not is, of course, contro­
versial. But the justification for Miranda is that - on balance - it 
does a better job of enforcing the Self-Incrimination Clause than the 
case-by-case voluntariness approach does. Miranda results in the ex­
clusion of some confessions that are not compelled within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment. But on the other side of the ledger, Miranda 
makes it more likely that the courts will exclude statements obtained 
by compulsion that otherwise would go undetected. Also, Miranda will 
deter law enforcement officers, to some degree, from trying to compel 
confessions. The characterization of Miranda as a prophylactic rule 
that "goes beyond" the Constitution seems to be a way of saying that 
Miranda represents this kind of deliberate choice to exclude some 
voluntary confessions, in exchange for the benefits of excluding or de­
terring some compelled confessions that would otherwise escape de­
tection. 
The crucial point, however, is that every principle of constitutional 
law reflects, implicitly, a comparable balancing of costs and benefits.1 6  
No principle enforces itself; no principle can be perfectly adminis-
16. For another statement of the arguments in the remainder of this section, see David 
A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988). 
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tered. In a regime in which courts make case-by-case inquiries into 
voluntariness, there are inevitably mistakes, in both directions: some 
compelled confessions are admitted into evidence, and some voluntary 
confessions are excluded. That is just the result of the fallibility of ju­
dicial factfinding. If the Constitution itself requires that all compelled 
confessions be excluded and all voluntary confessions be admitted, 
then Miranda is, certainly, an imperfect fit. But the case-by-case ap­
proach will also be an imperfect fit - and so will any other system. 
To put the point another way, the idea that Miranda "goes be­
yond" the Constitution seems to rest on the premise that a case-by­
case inquiry into voluntariness is somehow natural, or is found in the 
Constitution, so that any deviation from that approach is judicial law­
making of questionable legitimacy. But the Constitution does not or­
dain any particular institutional mechanism for ensuring that com­
pelled statements are not admitted into evidence. The case-by-case 
voluntariness approach is just one such mechanism. The Supreme 
Court has to decide if it is the right mechanism. It will make that deci­
sion by determining whether the case-by-case approach, on the whole, 
strikes the right balance of costs and benefits. The decision to adopt 
the case-by-case approach is, in this way, no different from a decision 
to reject that approach in favor of, say, Miranda. 
This point can be generalized well beyond the Self-Incrimination 
Clause. Many established principles of constitutional law have the 
same "prophylactic" character as Miranda. Take, for example, the 
central feature of First Amendment doctrine: the principle that laws 
that regulate speech on the basis of its content are presumed unconsti­
tutional.17 The text of the First Amendment, of course, does not say 
anything about content-based regulation; it just provides that Con­
gress shall make no law "abridging the freedom of speech."18 The pri­
mary justification for the principle condemning content-based regula­
tions is that such regulations are especially likely to be motivated by 
government hostility to the message being conveyed. "[W]hen regula­
tion is based on the content of speech, governmental action must be 
scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been 
prohibited 'merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's 
views."'19 But not every content-based regulation is the product of 
government "disapprov[al of] the speaker's views." A city might want 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1888 (2000); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). The governing First Amendment princi­
ples are actually more complex than this. For example, content-based restrictions are treated 
differently if they restrict only low-value speech, or if they do not prohibit speech with a cer­
tain content but only deny it a subsidy. But the presumption against content-based regula­
tion is unquestionably a central principle of First Amendment law. 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
19. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980) (quoting 
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
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to permit labor picketing near a hospital while forbidding anti­
abortion picketing because it has made a reasonable - perhaps even 
correct - determination that labor picketing is less likely to lead to 
violence. But such a content-based regulation would be unconstitu­
tional.20 
In other words, the principle forbidding content-based regulations 
is prophylactic. It forbids some restrictions on speech that are not 
impermissibly motivated and, in that sense, do not offend against the 
central values of the First Amendment. It does so because a case-by­
case inquiry into the government's motives in every case involving a 
regulation of speech is too likely to produce errors, and too likely to 
give governments an incentive to conceal their true motivations - to 
pretend to be suppressing speech for legitimate reasons while in fact 
suppressing it because they disagree with it. Also, the prohibition 
against content-based regulation is designed to take account of the in­
stitutional limitations and propensities of judges. Judges themselves, in 
evaluating restrictions on speech, might be influenced by the message 
of the speaker involved. If they proceed case by case, judges might be 
unjustifiably receptive to legislation that restricts speech with which 
they disagree. A clear, categorical rule against content-based regula­
tion makes it much more difficult for judges to be influenced, con­
sciously or not, by such considerations.21 
These justifications should sound familiar: they are the justifica­
tions for Miranda, too. Case-by-case determinations are unreliable, 
because judges will be too likely to make mistakes about the actual na­
ture of a government action; a case-by-case regime gives government 
officials too great an incentive to be conceal what they are doing. In­
stead of proceeding case by case, the courts therefore establish a cate­
gorical rule that will, inevitably, declare unconstitutional many gov­
ernment actions that are in fact unobjectionable - if the facts could 
ever be reliably found. The justification for that categorical rule is that 
it does a better job of enforcing the underlying constitutional com­
mand. All of these things are as true of the principle forbidding con­
tent-based regulation as they are of Miranda. But the former is a well­
established principle of unquestioned legitimacy. Is it a "prophylactic" 
rule that "sweeps more broadly" than the First Amendment "itself"? 
In a sense it plainly is. But the lesson is not that the centerpiece of 
First Amendment law must be scrapped in favor of case-by-case in­
quiries into legislative motive. The lesson is that the prophylactic 
20. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
21. Justice Scalia, the author of the Dickerson dissent, gives this as a reason that courts, 
in interpreting the Constitution, should try to eschew case-by-case approaches in favor of 
categorical rules. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1179-80, 1182-85 (1989). 
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character of Miranda does not make its legitimacy suspect in the way 
suggested by the Dickerson dissent. 
In Dickerson, the defendant and the United States, in explaining 
why § 3501 was unconstitutional, argued that other cases, besides 
Miranda, established prophylactic rules. One example that the gov­
ernment offered was the elaborate doctrine, also developed under the 
First Amendment, that defines the circumstances in which a speaker 
may be held liable for defamation. In these cases, beginning with New 
York Times v. Sullivan,22 the Supreme Court has held that sometimes 
the First Amendment prohibits a state from holding a speaker liable 
even for false and defamatory statements. (For example, a defendant 
may not be held liable for defaming a public official unless the defen­
dant can be shown to have acted with knowledge that the statement 
was false or with reckless disregard of the risk of falsity.) The Court 
has reached this conclusion even though, in the Court's own words, 
"there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact."23 
Why are some false statements protected by the First Amendment, 
even though they have "no constitutional value"? The Court gave the 
common sense answer in New York Times v. Sullivan itself: false 
speech must be protected to some degree in order to avoid discourag­
ing valuable speech. "[E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free de­
bate, and .. .  it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to 
have the 'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive. "'24 In other 
words, given the inevitable imprecision of judicial factfinding, a regime 
that protects only speech that has "constitutional value" will end up 
deterring too much valuable speech. Some speech that has (in the 
Court's own words) "no constitutional value" must also be protected, 
because the disadvantages of protecting it are outweighed by the 
gains. 
Again this justification parallels the justification for Miranda. The 
Supreme Court even characterized this line of cases as "extend[ing] a 
measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood."25 The 
Dickerson dissent tried to explain why the "strategic protection" of 
New York Times v. Sullivan is different from Miranda's "prophylaxis" 
by saying that the Court adopted the Sullivan rules "because the 
Court . . . viewed the importation of 'chill' as itself a violation of the 
First Amendment-not because the Court thought it could go beyond 
what the First Amendment demanded in order to provide some pro­
phylaxis. "26 But this just asserts the conclusion. Sullivan requires that 
22. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
23. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). 
24. 376 U.S. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
25. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342. 
26. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2344-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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statements with "no constitutional value" be protected for "strategic" 
reasons; if the notion of "go[ing] beyond what the First Amendment 
demand[ s] in order to provide some prophylaxis" has any meaning, 
then New York Times v. Sullivan did it. Sullivan held - to use the 
Dickerson dissent's terms - that what "the First Amendment de­
manded" is precisely "some prophylaxis." Miranda held the same 
thing about the Fifth Amendment. 
II. THE MIRANDA EXCEPTIONS 
Why has the Supreme Court not explicitly adopted this view of 
Miranda? That is, why didn't the majority in Dickerson call the dis­
sent's bluff and assert outright that the Self-Incrimination Clause, 
properly interpreted, requires the Miranda rules? Apparently the 
problem is the Court's repeated statements in earlier cases to the ef­
fect that the Miranda rules "sweep[] more broadly than the Fifth 
Amendment itself" and that a violation of Miranda does not constitute 
an "actual infringement of the suspect's constitutional rights."27 
The Court's statements to this effect uniformly occurred in cases 
that recognized exceptions to Miranda or limits on Miranda's exclu­
sionary rule - instances in which evidence would not be excluded 
even though it was the product of a violation of Miranda. In Michigan 
v. Tucker, 28 the Court allowed the prosecution to use the testimony of 
a witness who was discovered only because of a violation of Miranda. 
In New York v. Quarles,29 the Court held that a statement obtained in 
violation of Miranda could be admitted under a "public safety" excep­
tion. In Oregon v. Elstad,30 the Court held that testimonial fruits of a 
Miranda violation (specifically, a suspect's subsequent confession, ob­
tained in compliance with Miranda) could be admitted into evidence 
against a suspect. In each of these cases, the Court noted that the 
statements obtained in violation of Miranda were not compelled under 
the case-by-case voluntariness approach, and the Court said (or sug­
gested) that Miranda was a "prophylactic rule" that "sweeps more 
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself."31 
The language in these cases is imprecise and a little misleading, but 
in their logic, and their holdings, the cases are consistent with the basic 
27. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306, 308 (1985). 
28. 417 U.S. 433 (1974). 
29. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
30. 470 U.S. 298 (1985). 
31. Id. at 306. Harris v. New York held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda 
could be used to impeach a suspect. 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The Court did not explicitly rely on 
the distinction between "the Fifth Amendment itself' and "prophylactic rules" in Harris, but 
it later treated Harris as support for the idea that Miranda established such rules. See, e.g., 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307. 
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point: Miranda, although "prophylactic" in an important sense, is also 
required by the Fifth Amendment. Miranda excludes some statements 
that are not "compelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment 
- in itself an undesirable consequence, so far as the Constitution is 
concerned - but it does so because, on balance, the benefits of the 
Miranda rules, when compared with a case-by-case inquiry into com­
pulsion, outweigh that undesirable side effect. In certain circum­
stances, though, the comparison between Miranda and the case-by­
case approach might come out differently; the balance of costs and 
benefits might tip in favor of proceeding case by case. The Court rea­
soned, rightly or wrongly, that cases like Tucker, Quarles, and Elstad 
presented such circumstances. These circumstances called for refine­
ment of the Miranda rule, but the refinement did not change the basic 
character of the Miranda rules (with or without refinements) - that 
they are both prophylactic and "found in the Constitution" in the 
same way as other principles of constitutional law.3 2  
In Elstad, for example, the defendant made an incriminating 
statement without receiving Miranda warnings, but he made that 
statement in circumstances that would not support a finding of com­
pulsion in the case-by-case sense. The suspect was then warned and 
gave a full confession. The Court treated the first statement as inad­
missible; the question was whether the full confession was "tainted" 
and therefore inadmissible, on the assumption that it was the product 
(the "fruit") of the first statement. (The argument that the confession 
was the fruit of the first statement is that the defendant gave the con­
fession only because he thought the first statement had let the prover­
bial cat out of the bag.) The Supreme Court held that the confession 
was admissible. The Court nevertheless adhered to the rule that, in 
these circumstances, the confession would not have been admissible if 
the first statement had been "actually compelled" - that is, if an in­
quiry under the case-by-case voluntariness approach had concluded 
that the first confession was compelled.33 
The Court reasoned that Elstad - and other cases in which the 
Court created an exception to Miranda34 - presented a different bal­
ance of costs and benefits from Miranda itself.35 It is true that, under 
Elstad, many of the costs that Miranda sought to avoid will be in­
curred. Courts will have to make a case-by-case inquiry into the volun­
tariness of a statement obtained without warnings - the first state-
32. For a valuable discussion of the relationship between the Miranda "exceptions" and 
prophylactic rules, see Susan Klein, Identifying and ( Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe 
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1030 
(2001). 
33. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318. 
34. See, e.g., Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657. 
35. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-09. 
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ment, in the Elstad situation. That determination will be somewhat 
unreliable, for all the well-known reasons that gave rise to Miranda. 
This is a significant drawback of the Elstad rule. Elstad also gives the 
police an incentive to try to coerce incriminating statements by subtle, 
undetectable means, another of the problems Miranda sought to 
avoid; if the police can do so, they can then, under Elstad, try to use 
those statements, themselves inadmissible, to obtain an admissible 
confession. 
But the Court concluded that in the Elstad situation these disad­
vantages are small enough to be outweighed by the advantages. The 
unfavorable incentive given to law enforcement officers, the Court 
reasoned, is not that great. The scenario to worry about is one in 
which the police (i) withhold warnings; (ii) coerce a statement with 
enough subtlety to avoid detection in a voluntariness hearing; (iii) 
then give the suspect warnings; and (iv) use the previous unwarned 
statement to induce the suspect to confess, or confess again. Elstad 
creates a risk that such police conduct will occur, but the risk is less 
than the risk of an undetectably coerced confession in the pre­
M iranda regime, or so the Court thought. On the other hand, without 
the Elstad exception, completely voluntary confessions would be ex­
cluded. The Court concluded that in these circumstances the best bal­
ance would be struck by admitting the second confession. 
Whatever one thinks of the holding in Elstad, there is nothing in­
consistent, in principle, between this approach and the view that 
Miranda is required by the Self-Incrimination Clause. Miranda is re­
quired by the Self-Incrimination Clause because that Clause has to be 
implemented in some way; any method of implementation will strike 
some balance of advantages and disadvantages; and Miranda strikes 
the best balance in the circumstances presented by that case. In differ­
ent circumstances, such as in Elstad (or Quarles, or Tucker) , a differ­
ent balance might be best. 
To make the comparison to the First Amendment once again, the 
constitutional rules governing defamation of public officials are differ­
ent from the rules governing defamation of private individuals, which 
are in turn different from the rules governing defamation that ad­
dresses no subject of public interest. These differences do not mean 
that the rule of New York Times v. Sullivan is not a constitutional rule. 
They just mean that the constitutional rule that applies in one set of 
circumstances might have to be altered when different circumstances 
arise - a wholly unremarkable proposition. The Court in Dickerson, 
in trying to explain why Elstad and similar cases did not impugn the 
constitutional basis of Miranda, said that those cases only illustrate 
that "no constitutional rule is immutable."36 Perhaps a better way to 
36. 120 S. Ct. at 2335. 
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put it is that often constitutional rules are not simple but require a de­
gree of complexity and refinement - a point that is obvious in many 
areas of constitutional law. It may be that the Court struck the wrong 
balance in Elstad, or in one of the other cases creating an exception to 
Miranda (or, for that matter, in Miranda itself). But the fact that the 
Court refined the balance it struck in Miranda, when cases presenting 
different circumstances arose, has no bearing on the constitutional 
status or legitimacy of that decision. 
III. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 
If Miranda is as legitimate a principle of constitutional law as any 
other, what does that say about Congress's role in the development of 
constitutional principles? The Miranda opinion itself famously sug­
gested that the precise rules established by that case were subject to 
being modified by congressional or state legislation, so long as the 
legislation provided protection equivalent to that provided by the 
Miranda rules themselves. The Court held in Dickerson that § 3501 
did not provide equivalent protection but rather reverted essentially to 
the state of affairs that existed before Miranda was decided. The dis­
sent did not take issue with that characterization of § 3501, and the 
Court's conclusion on this point seems clearly correct. 
Several questions remain, however. First, if Miranda is indeed a 
constitutional rule, how can it be replaced by legislation, even if the 
legislation provides equivalent protection? Or, conversely, if the 
Miranda warnings can be replaced by legislation, how can Miranda be 
part of the Constitution?37 The short answer to these questions is: 
even if Miranda is a fully legitimate principle of constitutional law, 
why shouldn't Congress be able to replace it with some other regime, 
if Congress's statutory alternative really does as good a job as the 
Miranda rules themselves? Once we recognize that constitutional rules 
often rest on a judgment about institutional capacities and propensi­
ties - the reliability vel non of judicial factfinding procedures, the 
risks of giving bad incentives to government officials, and so on -
there is no good reason to preclude Congress and the states from try­
ing to solve the same problem that the courts are addressing - that is, 
from trying to implement the Constitution with the best balance of 
costs and benefits.38 
37. Apparently, the Court itself began to speak of Miranda as an extraconstitutional 
decision in part because of the statement, in Miranda, that Congress or the states could dis­
place the Miranda rules by equivalent legisla.tion. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306 n.l. 
38. For a discussion of possible legislative responses to Miranda that reaches a similar 
conclusion, by a somewhat different route, see Michael C. Dorf and Barry Friedman, Shared 
Constitutional Interpretation, 2000 SUP. Cr. REV. (forthcoming). 
970 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:958 
Once again the comparison to New York Times v. Sullivan is in­
structive. While no one, as far as I know, has questioned the legitimacy 
of Sullivan in the way that Miranda's legitimacy is questioned, many 
people disagree with Sullivan on the merits. That is, they maintain that 
Sullivan does not strike the best balance between protecting First 
Amendment values and allowing states to protect people's reputa­
tions. As an alternative to Sullivan, many have recommended, in par­
ticular, a regime in which courts would determine whether an alleg­
edly defamatory statement was false and, if it was, either require the 
speaker to publish a retraction or impose strictly limited damages.39 
The argument is that such an alternative would avoid much of the 
chilling effect that is Sullivan's principal concern while reducing unre­
dressed damage to reputation. 
If such a scheme (or some other alternative) did indeed strike as 
good or better a balance than Sullivan, there would be no good reason 
for the Court to reject a statute that adopted it. But no one questions 
the constitutional status of Sullivan. Analogously, one need not ques­
tion the constitutional status of Miranda to conclude that a legislature 
could provide a substitute for Miranda, if the substitute struck as good 
a balance as Miranda does between the competing interests involved 
in custodial interrogation. 
But who decides whether the alternative strikes as good a balance 
as Miranda? That is the more fundamental question. More precisely, 
how much deference should the courts give to a legislature's determi­
nation that its alternative is equally effective? This question was not 
really raised by Dickerson, because, as I said, it was quite clear that § 
3501 was not a serious effort to accomplish what Miranda sought to 
accomplish but was rather just an effort to overrule Miranda. But the 
question is important in practical terms in case 
Congress, or a state legislature, responds to Dickerson by enacting a 
statute that does seem more genuinely designed to take the Miranda 
Court's invitation seriously. In addition, this question highlights the 
relationship between Dickerson and some of the Court's most impor­
tant recent decisions - decisions that raised the question of how much 
deference the courts should give to Acts of Congress that rest on an 
assessment of facts or institutional circumstances that is different from 
the Court's own.40 
The Supreme Court's most significant recent statement on this is­
sue is City of Boerne v. Flores,41 which involved the constitutionality of 
39. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 771-74 
(1985) (White, J., concurring). 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College 
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
41. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"). RFRA, a federal 
statute, prohibited any state or federal law from imposing a "substan­
tial[ ] burden[ ]" on the exercise of religion unless the law was the least 
restrictive means of furthering a compelling state interest.42 Congress's 
admitted reason for enacting RFRA was that it disagreed with the 
Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith,43 which 
held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not 
forbid Congress or the states from enacting laws that impose burdens 
on religious practices, so long as those laws do not single out religion 
and are not motivated by hostility toward religion. Congress sought to 
justify RFRA as an exercise of its power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which gives Congress the power "to enforce, 
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."44 (The Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to 
incorporate the First Amendment's protection of the "free exercise of 
religion.") 
In City of Boerne, the Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitu­
tional. The Court reasoned that Congress's power "to enforce" the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not include the power "to determine 
what constitutes a constitutional violation."45 Rather, the Court said, 
Section 5 gives Congress only the power to remedy what the Court 
would determine to be violations of the Constitution. The Court then 
concluded that RFRA exceeded the scope of Congress's remedial 
power because there was a lack of "congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means 
adopted to that end."46 RFRA, the Court said, "is so out of proportion 
to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be under­
stood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional be­
havior. "47 
The central distinction that the Court drew in City of Boerne - be­
tween "enforc[ing] a constitutional right" and "determin[ing] what 
constitutes a constitutional violation"48 - is, in an important way, in­
consistent with Dickerson. In fact, that very distinction is the basis of 
the Dickerson dissent. The Miranda rules are, as the Court has said 
many times, a way of "enforc[ing the] constitutional right" to be free 
from compelled self-incrimination. Therefore, under the logic of City 
42. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (1994)). 
43. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
45. 521 U.S. at 519. 
46. Id. at 520. 
47. Id. at 532. 
48. Id. at 519. 
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of Boerne - and according to the decisions that describe the Miranda 
warnings as "prophylactic" rules that "sweep more broadly than" the 
Self-Incrimination Clause - Miranda does not "determine what con­
stitutes a constitutional violation." But that means, according to City 
of Boerne, that Miranda falls into Congress's province, not the 
Court's. Dickerson held otherwise. 
The problem with City of Boerne - and the reason Dickerson is 
correct - is that there is no sharp distinction between interpreting and 
enforcing the Constitution. Consider again the principle that content­
based regulation of speech is presumptively unconstitutional. Does 
that principle just "enforce" the First Amendment, by helping prevent 
improperly motivated legislation? Or is it an interpretation that "de­
termines the content" of the First Amendment? The answer is that it 
is both. Much of what the courts do, when they "interpret" the Consti­
tution and "determine its content," is to design principles that "en­
force" the underlying constitutional requirement by preventing or 
remedying actions that threaten constitutional values. 
The decision in Employment Division v. Smith reflected a judg­
ment that case-by-case inquiries into government motives will ade­
quately protect the free exercise of religion. That judgment was based 
in part on a view about the proper understanding of the First 
Amendment phrase "the free exercise of religion." But, like Miranda, 
Smith was based on a judgment about the courts' institutional capacity 
to detect constitutional violations through a case-by-case inquiry, and 
on a judgment about the likelihood that the states and the other 
branches of the federal government would try to evade constitutional 
requirements (consciously or not) by disguising, as neutral, legislation 
that was in fact improperly motivated. Those kinds of judgments are 
involved in "enforcing" the Constitution, a power that City of Boerne 
concedes to Congress; they are also involved in interpreting the 
Constitution, in Miranda, Smith, and many other cases. It is simply not 
possible to draw a sharp distinction between the two; "enforcement" is 
inextricably, and properly, a part of "interpretation." 
This does not answer the question of how far Congress may go in 
second-guessing the Court's interpretations. The fact that there is no 
clear distinction between "enforcement" and "interpretation" does 
not mean that RFRA was constitutional, any more than it means that 
§ 3501 was constitutional. But it does, at least, pose the right question: 
how much deference should Congress's judgments be given? The 
Court in City of Boerne was explicitly concerned that, if Congress had 
the power to "interpret" as well as "enforce" the Constitution, there 
would be no effective limit on Congress's power.49 That concern is ob­
viously legitimate. The problem is that the device that City of Boerne 
49. Id. at 529. 
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chose to limit Congress's power - a sharp distinction between inter­
pretation and enforcement - does not hold up. 
How much deference should Congress be given, then, when it sec­
ond-guesses the courts' judgment about what is needed adequately to 
protect constitutional rights? The answer should depend, not on a 
conceptual distinction between interpretation and enforcement, but 
on an assessment of Congress's own capacities and propensities. For 
example, it has become a fixed point of constitutional law that popu­
larly elected bodies cannot be fully trusted to regulate freedom of ex­
pression, because they are too likely to be tempted to limit speech that 
they dislike.so Similarly, legislation that is hostile to certain kinds of 
minority groups - "discrete and insular" minorities, in the canonical 
formulation - is more closely reviewed by the courts, partly on the 
ground that those groups are not able fully to protect themselves in 
the legislative process. s1 For several decades after the New Deal, the 
Supreme Court seemed to have settled on the opposite principle when 
reviewing federal legislation that threatened state prerogatives. The 
idea was that states are able adequately to protect themselves in 
Congress, so when only federalism was at stake, Congress's determina­
tions could be trusted completely.s2 Recently, in City of Boerne and 
other cases, the Court has reconsidered this view; the Court's declara­
tion that it will review acts of Congress for "congruence and propor­
tionality" reflects this new distrust of congressional judgments in this 
area. The Court's new solicitude for states' prerogatives can certainly 
be criticized, but at least it is potentially directed to the right question: 
whether, and to what extent, Congress can be trusted to make the 
judgments involved in the inextricably entwined tasks of interpreting 
and enforcing the Constitution. 
To what extent should the courts trust the legislative judgments 
underlying any successor to § 3501 that might try to redefine the rights 
of suspects subjected to custodial interrogation? Statutes that limit the 
rights of criminal suspects do not receive a full measure of deference 
from the courts. The Supreme Court has not been very explicit about 
this, but it shows little tendency to defer to legislative assessments of 
50. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST ch. 5 (1980). 
51. The idea that legislation must be more closely scrutinized by the courts when it is 
directed at "discrete and insular minorities" is, of course, derived from United States v. 
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). For criticism, see, for example, Bruce A. 
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985). 
52. The best-known statement of this position is Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safe­
guards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National 
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The Supreme Court explicitly adopted this ap­
proach in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 & n. 
11 (1985). See also generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political 
Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (arguing that informal political 
institutions protect federalism). 
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the extent to which criminal suspects should be protected by the Bill 
9f Rights.53 The courts have never fully articulated the reason for this 
lack of deference, but, by analogy to other constitutional rights, the 
reason seems to be that in this area, public hostility to the rights in­
volved might improperly skew a legislature's judgment. Were Con­
gress to respond to Dickerson by providing what purported to be an 
adequate substitute for Miranda, the courts could properly undertake 
a careful review of the justifications advanced for the legislation to en­
sure that it was indeed based on a convincing assessment of institu­
tional realities. There seems to be no reason, for example, to review 
such a law under a standard less stringent than that which the Court 
applies when it is dealing with regulations that are specifically directed 
to speech but are not based on the content of speech;54 perhaps an 
even more rigorous standard might be appropriate. The approach the 
Court takes should acknowledge that Congress may have superior 
competence to make the institutional judgments that are involved in 
deciding what regime should govern custodial interrogation, while still 
making sure that the courts play their historic role of protecting the 
rights of criminal suspects. 
But the justification for this relatively intrusive judicial review is 
not that Congress has no role to play in defining constitutional rights. 
On the contrary: once constitutional rights are understood, as they 
must be, as partly but inevitably "prophylactic" in nature, there should 
be no objection, in principle, to Congress's playing a role in their 
elaboration. Dickerson is best justified on the ground that constitu­
tional principles - full-fledged, fully legitimate constitutional princi­
ples - are routinely "prophylactic" in the way Miranda is. That is why 
the Court in Dickerson was justified in declaring § 3501 unconstitu­
tional. But the other side of that coin is that constitutional interpreta­
tion will often rest on the kinds of judgments that Congress is in a 
good position to make. When it does, Congress's determinations are 
entitled to an appropriate degree of deference. United States v. 
Dickerson, which is on the surface a ringing reaffirmation of judicial 
supremacy, contains the seeds of a more full acknowledgement that 
both the courts and Congress play a legitimate role in the interpreta­
tion of the Constitution. 
53. For example, the Court has invalidated federal statutes that authorized searches that 
the Court considered unreasonable, without indicating that the legislative judgment was en­
titled to deference. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
54. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Syst., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 192-96 (1997). 
